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Abstract 
This article investigates the impact of military spending changes on economic growth in 
China over the period 1953 to 2010. Using two-state Markov switching specifications, the 
results suggest that the relationship between military spending changes and economic growth 
is state dependent. Specifically, the results show that military spending changes affect 
economic growth negatively during a slower growth - higher variance state, while positively 
within a faster growth - lower variance one. It is also demonstrated that military spending 
changes contain information about the growth transition probabilities. As a policy tool, the 
results indicate that increases in military spending can be detrimental to growth during slower 
growth – higher volatility periods. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Over the last few decades there has been a considerable attention on the 
macroeconomic effects of military spending from both policy-makers and academics alike. 
The general argument is that any potential change in the defence spending will affect 
economic growth in an economy (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Dunne, 1996, for a 
detailed analysis). More specifically, the linkages between military spending and economic 
growth can be summarized by two main theoretical views. The Keynesian income multiplier 
effect posits that military spending affects economic growth positively, whereas crowding out 
hypothesis favours a negative growth impact of military spending. 
        In this study, we contribute to the existing literature by examining regime-switching in 
the relationship between military spending changes and economic growth in China over the 
period 1953 to 2010. Given the rise of China as global economic and military major power, 
the linkage between its military spending and economic growth has drawn much attention 
over the recent years (see Dimitraki and Menla Ali, 2013, for a comprehensive review).
1
 Most of the existing empirical studies have assumed linear dependence and constant 
parameters (e.g., Chen, 1993; Masih et al.,1997; Wolde-Rufael, 2001; among others), which 
                                                          
1 
Dimitraki and Menla Ali (2013) found that military spending is driven by the economic development in the 
long-run in China. In this article, we examine whether military spending changes have any short-run dynamic 
impact on growth or not. This is also in line with what is known as the fiscal multiplier effect of military 
spending (see Hall, 2009, for a thorough theoretical and empirical discussion). 
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is not the case since the Chinese economic system underwent structural changes in the light of 
the policy reforms undertaken since 1978. Indeed, China has observed unprecedented 
episodes of economic growth over the last few years. The Chinese economy has been growing 
at an annual rate of 9.7% over the period 1978 to 2010 as opposed to 6.4% during 1953-
1977.
2
 
 Although a number of studies have provided evidence for the nonlinear relationship 
between military spending and growth (e.g., Landau, 1993; Stroup and Heckelman, 2001; 
Aizenman and Glick, 2006; Kalaitzidakis and Tzouvelekas, 2011; among others), the 
nonlinear dependence between these two variables with reference to China has drawn less 
attention. The only exception is the study by Lai et al. (2005), who examined the arms race 
between China and Taiwan and using a multivariate threshold regression they found that 
defence spending leads the Chinese economic growth only in one regime (when Taiwan’s 
spending growth is less than 5%).  
Considering the recent evidence of Lai et al. (2005) on nonlinear dependence, this 
article uses the Markov regime-switching model as an alternative way to examine the 
nonlinear relation between military spending changes and economic growth in China. To the 
best of our knowledge, the regime-switching relationship between the two variables has not 
been explored in the literature yet. The existence of multiple growth regimes and parameter 
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Growth figures, sourced from China’s Statistical Yearbooks, are calculated by the authors. 
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heterogeneity has been widely known by now. The multiple steady states and growth regimes 
have been attributed mainly to the dynamics of business cycles (e.g., Hamilton, 1989) and 
also to the presence of what is known as sizable spillovers (e.g., Azariadis and Drazen, 1990).  
The chosen econometric model will enable us to examine the impact of military 
spending changes on economic growth in two states of growth by allowing the data 
themselves to identify these states. That is, when economic growth is fast/slow and when the 
growth exhibits high/low volatility. Intuitively, military spending budgets may not be the 
same during expansionary and recessionary periods and also when the growth is highly 
volatile and less volatile. In fact, there is now evidence that military spending changes with 
the dynamics of economic growth. All major economic powers, including the US, the UK, the 
European Union and China, have set public investment programs in order to counter the 
global recession of 2007-2008 (Custers, 2010). Furthermore, Wood (2010) reports that the 
economic basis of the military spending fluctuation in China is mainly due to the dynamics of 
GDP. Also, the Chinese decisions related to the allocation of resources on defence were 
based, among other factors, on its economic performance (e.g., improved economic 
performance allows expansion of the military spending) and the timing of its various five year 
economic plans (e.g., 1953-1957; 1958-1962; 1966-1970; 1971-1975; 1976-1980; 1981-1985; 
etc) (Cusak and Ward, 1981). In particular, during the period of the economic plans China 
was trading off the defence spending by boosting investment or consumption to promote 
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economic growth. The military spending was increasing mainly at the beginning of the 
economic plans, whilst the economic resources were directed to socioeconomic purposes 
afterwards (which were promoted by the developmental plans) (Cusak and Ward, 1981). 
The adopted model will also provide us with inference regarding the impact of 
military spending changes on the transition probabilities associated with switching of growth 
states. Knowledge of the regime-switching relation between military spending changes and 
economic growth may provide important policy implications. Policy makers can set the 
appropriate policies with regard to military and non-military budgets depending on the state 
of the economy. For example, if military spending has adverse effects on economic growth in 
a state of recession or if military spending keeps growth in the recessionary state, 
expansionary policies to boost the economy could then be unsuccessful if military spending is 
large. In addition, an economic boost may be deemed by military spending cutbacks or 
spending with due consideration. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of China’s growth and defence policies. Section 3 reviews the theoretical and empirical work 
on the linear and nonlinear relationship between military spending and economic growth. 
Section 4 outlines the econometric methodology conducted in the study. Section 5 describes 
the data and discusses the empirical results, and finally Section 6 concludes. 
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II. An Overview of China’s Growth and Defence Policies 
 
The current renewed interest in China’s defence spending and its military 
modernization requires shedding further light on the relationship between military spending 
policies and strategies and economic growth in China. Even though there were considerable 
changes in industry, infrastructure and telecommunications, China did not commence into a 
fast rising economic growth before 1949 as a result of fiscal weaknesses and a low rate of 
government spending (approximately 9% in relation to national income). However, the year 
1949 was China’s actual turning point in the growth process due to a socioeconomic 
uprising.
3
 In addition, economic growth is a long-term process that is based on the 
accumulation of capital (both physical and human), along with the development of institutions 
to support any socio-political and economic changes (Richardson, 1999).  
As far as China’s growth effects of military spending are concerned, they were, in 
comparison to other nations, not restricted to the production of weapons. Since 1949 the 
People’s Liberation Army played a rather developmental role in promoting economic growth 
via investment in the military technology (and as an extent in the Chinese military industry). 
Furthermore, since Mao’s developmental and military technology programs, China’s 
                                                          
3
 According to Naughton (2007), the increased strain on the living standards as a result of the increase in the 
population growth, the absence of technological innovations, the danger of famine and diseases and mainly the 
uneven distribution of income were some of the reasons that were lunging the existing socioeconomic system. 
7 
 
fundamental policies were concentrated on both national security and economic prosperity via 
what is known as technological infusion (Feigenbaum, 1999).
4
  In particular, China’s defence 
spending was mostly an assurance to preserve national security and uphold the world peace.
5
  
It follows that the Chinese military expenditures, especially the national investment 
policies towards the military industry and the R&D, link the defence sector with the Chinese 
developmental strategies (Feigenbaum, 1999). For example, Marshal Nie Rongzhen (a 
Chinese defence technical leader) argued that China should rely on the defence industry (as 
part of the Chinese modernization policy) not only due to security issues but explicitly the 
military technology diffusion will boost China’s overall economic growth (especially by 
fostering industrial innovations and setting the basis for advanced technological diligences) 
(Feigenbaum, 1999). Undoubtedly, the Chinese economic development also depends on 
financial and trade ties with other countries and China is likely not to jeopardize such ties 
(Roy, 1994). 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Those policies are known as ‘techno-nationalism’ which identify further a direct link between military 
spending policies and a country’s economic development mainly via the channel of investment (Feigenbaum, 
1999). 
5
 Naughton (2007) argued that China’s fundamental principle is to safeguard national security and harmony and 
guarantee progress of building a developed society (e.g., to attract new investors as part of their development 
policies). 
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III. A Review of the Literature 
 
The relationship between defence expenditure and economic growth has become 
widely debated both theoretically and empirically. On the one hand, the transfer of resources 
from the civilian to the military sector creates the crowding out effect, and on the other, the 
defence sector provides positive externalities (especially in less developed countries) through 
channels such as infrastructure, human capital formation (e.g., education, training) and 
technological advancements (Ram, 1995). Another channel for the positive impact of military 
spending stems from the fact that military spending provides a country with security (both 
internally and externally) which in turn attracts foreign investors, especially those of long-
term investment plans (Benoit, 1973).   
The empirical findings are also inconclusive. More specifically, since Benoit’s (1978) 
seminal paper, who found the existence of a positive relationship between military 
expenditure and economic growth in developing countries, there sparked a bulk of empirical 
research to challenge his findings. The literature approached the issue from different 
theoretical and methodological perspectives, different periods and applications in various 
geographical areas and commonalities (e.g., high-low growth or non-conflict and conflict 
states).  
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While the impact of military expenditures on economic growth in developing 
countries is found to be insignificant (Deger and Sen, 1992, 1995), such an impact turns out to 
be relatively stronger and negative in developed countries (Kollias et al., 2007). All in all, the 
empirical studies suggest that military expenditure is either positively (e.g., Chester, 1978; 
Weede, 1983; Chowdhury, 1991; Kusi, 1994; among others) or negatively related to growth 
(e.g., Sandler and Hartley, 1995; Knight et al., 1996; Heo, 1999; Shieh et al., 2002; among 
others ), while others conclude that there is no discernible relationship between the prolonged 
variables (e.g., Wallace, 1980; Lindgren, 1984; Majeski, 1992; Mintz and Stevenson, 1995; 
among others). The findings with reference to China are also mixed as demonstrated in a 
recent survey by Dimitraki and Menla Ali (2013) and Table 1 which reports the existing 
empirical studies for China. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Since these aforementioned studies have mainly adopted linear methods in analyzing 
the linkage between military spending and economic growth, the ambiguity of the findings of 
these studies may be due to the use of different models (i.e., causality is a model dependent 
setup, see Hendry and Ericsson, 1991) and the models may be sensitive to the samples 
selected and nonlinearity may also be important. Indeed, several empirical studies concluded 
that nonlinearities are highly associated with fiscal policy variables such as government 
expenditure, taxes, the overall size of deficit, etc (see Barro, 1990; Giavanni et al., 2000). 
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Furthermore, Pieroni (2009) argued that if the nonlinearities are not statistically controlled 
for, any relationship between military burden and economic growth might be questionable as 
the correlation between them might be wrongly specified, and thence erroneous conclusions 
might be drawn.  
Empirical studies on the nonlinear relationship between military spending and 
economic growth include Kinsella (1990), Landau (1993), Hooker and Knetter (1997), Heo 
(1998), Stroup and Heckelman (2001), Gerace (2002), Lai et al. (2005), Aizenman and Glick 
(2006), Cuaresma and Reitschuler (2006), Yakovlef (2007), and Yang et al. (2011), among 
others. To the best of our knowledge, the only empirical study of the nonlinear relationship 
between military spending and economic growth with reference to China is the study by Lai 
et al. (2005) (see Table 1). This paper, by contrast, aims to provide a further nonlinear 
evidence between the two variables in China using the Makov switching specifications. 
 
IV. The Markov Switching Model 
 
        In this study, we examine the nonlinear impact of military spending changes on 
economic growth in China over the period 1953 to 2010. The Markov regime-switching 
model developed by Hamilton (1989, 1990) is particularly appropriate to examine economic 
growth in different regimes. More specifically, economic growth is allowed to be shifted in 
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the mean and the variance, that is, for periods of expansion and contraction and high volatility 
and low volatility.
6
 The model is specified as follows: 
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where  yt  and  xt  denote respectively the economic growth and changes in military spending 
and 
t  is a white noise term. zt-1 is a vector of control variables proposed in the growth 
literature
7
 (e.g., Barro 1990), namely non-defence spending changes
8
, government investment 
changes
9
, population growth, and human capital changes with coefficients ,, 21  3 and 4 , 
respectively.
10
 Autoregressive terms (up to two lags)
11
 are also considered in case there is 
persistence, if any, in the conditional mean of economic growth.  
                                                          
6
 Hamilton (1989), Arin and Spagnolo (2011), and Jerzmanowski (2006), among many others, have shown that 
the Markov regime-switching model is particularly appropriate for modelling the growth states, while similar 
findings were found by Smith et al. (2002) for military expenditures. 
7
 There are a number of variables affecting economic growth (see Levine and Renelt, 1992, for a thorough 
discussion). This paper follows recommendations made by Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
for the most common variables that affect economic growth and used in the literature. 
8
 Defence plus non-defence spending constitute government consumption. 
9
 Government investment is the variable ‘ci’ from PWT 7.1 and is defined (in PWT 7.1) as ‘Investment Share of 
PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at current prices %’. 
10
 By doing so, our underlying theoretical model follows the Barro style growth model derived from Barro 
(1990) and adjusted by Devarajan et al. (1996) to take into account military and non-military spending.  
11 
Following the LSE approach to econometrics, we check autocorrelations up to 2 years dynamics, hence 2 
observations in our case. 
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Since  yt  is being modelled as conditional normal, the mean, 
ts
 , the variance, 2
st
  and 
the slope of military spending changes,
ts
 , depend on the state st, }2,1{ts , that is in 
operation. The nonobservable state variable st is assumed to follow a first-order Markov 
process with constant transition probabilities specified as follows: 
 
)(Pr 1 is|jsp ttij                                                                                                            (2)      
                                                                                                                              
where the probability of being in state j based on the information on the whole series will be 
referred to as the smoothed probability, ),....,(Pr 1 Tt yy|js  . In order to check the sensitivity 
of the identified regimes to the exogenous variables (e.g., military spending changes and 
control variables), we also estimate Equation 1 without any exogenous variables. 
Furthermore, to examine whether military spending changes provide any inference 
about the transition probabilities associated with switching between growth states, we allow 
these transition probabilities to be time varying (see Filardo, 1994). In particular, rather than 
examining the impact of military spending changes, xt-1, on economic growth directly, as 
specified in Equation 1, we allow these transition probabilities to depend on xt-1 instead.
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That is, the growth transition probabilities are specified as follows: 
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 Note that the impact of military spending changes on the growth transition probabilities is estimated by 
keeping the growth control variables in Equation 1. 
13 
 
 
}exp{1
}exp{
110
11011





t
t
t
x
x
P


,  
}exp{1
}exp{
110
11022





t
t
t
x
x
P


.                                                  (3)                                                                                                                                                         
 
Note that if an increase in military spending leads to an increase in the probability of staying 
in state 1, one would anticipate 
1 > 0 . On the other hand, 1 < 0 indicates that an increase in 
military spending results in a decrease in the probability of staying in state 2.  
The model estimation is conducted by maximum likelihood using the expectation 
maximization algorithm described by Hamilton (1989, 1990). Furthermore, for comparison 
purposes, several constant parameter models are also estimated using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS). Such models have been frequently estimated in the literature and may take the 
following forms:  
A model without exogenous variables: 
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A model with military spending changes only: 
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A model with military spending changes and control variables: 
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More details on the estimation process of the models described above and the data are given 
in the next Section. 
 
V.  Data Description and Empirical Results 
 
            The data used to estimate the model are annual observations for China over the period 
1953 to 2010 and were retrieved from the following sources. Economic growth of real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), population (in millions), non-defence spending and military 
expenditures are from Chine’s Statistical Yearbooks, while the data for government 
investment and human capital are from the Penn World Tables.
13
 For robustness purposes, the 
results are also estimated using real GDP growth from Penn World Tables (version 8).
14
 
                                                          
13
 Version 7.1 of Penn World Tables is used to obtain government investment, whereas human capital is 
retrieved from version 8.  
14
 See Waller (1997), Wang (1999) and Orlik (2012) for a thorough discussion related to the reliability and 
reasons for variances of the Chinese data; Bing-Fu and Liming (2006) for a discussion about overestimates of the 
Chinese data from Western mainstream and issues with exchange rates; Sun and Yu (1999) who state that 
differences in sources might be systematic but are still qualitatively the same; Bo and Xing (2011) for a 
discussion of the differences in statistical methodology and the institution of the defence system between China 
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Table 2 reports a summary of descriptive statistics of the relevant variables: military 
spending changes and economic growth. The annual mean of economic growth in China is 
positive (8%), whilst the corresponding mean for military spending changes is negative (-3%). 
With regard to volatility, economic growth exhibits lower volatility (by two and a half times) 
than military spending changes. Furthermore, the two variables exhibit strong excess kurtosis 
and skewness. The Jarque-Bera (JB) test statistics show that normality is rejected at the 1% 
level for both variables.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In order to examine the time series properties of the relevant variables, we run the 
more powerful DF-GLS unit root test of Elliott et al. (1996). Also, the minimum LM unit root 
test of Lee and Strazicich (2004) with one structural break in the intercept and the trend is 
reported. The latter is likely to be instructive as the time series under examination involve the 
Chinese policy reforms in the early 1980s. Unlike the Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root test 
with a single endogenous structural break, the LM test is known to have no size distortion and 
spurious rejections in the presence of a break under the null hypothesis.
15
 The results, as 
displayed in Table 3, show that both military spending changes and economic growth are I(0) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and Western mainstream; and Dunne (1996) for a thorough explanation that there should be no concern for the 
source of origin for data used in time series analysis as long as their definitions do not change significantly.  
15 
The endogenous breakpoint in the Zivot  and Andrews (1992) test is chosen where a one sided test statistic on 
the coefficient in the ADF test is minimized (i.e., the most negative). Hence, such test favours to reject the null 
hypothesis of unit root for a trend stationary process with a break. 
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processes. Fig. 1 displays the annual time series pattern of economic growth and military 
spending changes over the period 1953 to 2010. It is also evident from this figure that the two 
series are covariance stationary.  
[Insert Table 3 and Fig. 1  about here] 
The OLS as well as the maximum likelihood estimates are reported in Table 4. 
Columns 1 and 4 report the estimates of the two competing (linear and nonlinear) models 
without the presence of any exogenous or control variables, respectively. Columns 2 and 3 
report the results respectively after including military spending changes only, as in Equation 
5, and military spending changes along with control variables, as in Equation 6. Furthermore, 
while column 5 reports the results of the Markov switching relation between military 
spending changes and economic growth including control variables and assuming fixed 
transition probabilities, as in Equation 1, column 6 lists the results of the time-varying 
transition probability Markov switching model of the relation between military spending 
changes and economic growth, as in Equation 3, including also the growth control variables. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
        The linearity hypothesis against the Markov switching alternative cannot be tested 
using a standard likelihood ratio test as the parameters of the second state are not determined 
under the null of a single state model. Garcia (1998) derives the asymptotic critical values for 
Hansen’s (1992) test for several two state Markov switching models. The 1% critical value of 
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the likelihood ratio statistic for the considered two state Markov models is less than 17.38. In 
the case at hand, the likelihood ratio statistic, calculated from the models in columns 1 and 4, 
is 45.52 which is well above the critical value and indicates the significance of the second 
state. The nonlinear structure in the economic growth is also confirmed by Tsay (1986) test 
(see Table 4).  
The OLS results in Column 2 indicate that changes in military spending have a 
negative impact on the economic growth of China. After extending the growth regression with 
the control variables in Column 3, the above impact remains negative but becomes weak 
(significant at the 12% level). This evidence is in contrast to Chen (1993), who found no 
causality between military spending and economic growth in China and also, opposite to 
Masih et al. (1997) and Lai et al. (2005), who estimated a positive effect. Among the control 
variables, only population growth appears to exert a positive effect on growth.  
To obtain further insights into the form of the relationship between military spending 
changes and economic growth, we estimate a moving window to the OLS regression specified 
in Equation 5. We select a window length equal to 3 years.
16
 The estimated constant and slope 
coefficient of military spending changes with their corresponding standard errors are 
                                                          
16
 The results are also confirmed by using a window length equal to 5 years. These results are available upon 
request. 
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displayed in Fig. 2. The graphical analysis indicates that both the intercept as well as the slope 
coefficient evolve significantly over time, confirming that the relation between economic 
growth and military spending changes is nonlinear. Hence, the relation between the two 
variables requires modelling by using a nonlinear specification. The Markov-switching model 
applied in this study is particularly useful and advantageous to other nonlinear specifications 
such as threshold regression and breaks analyses. When using break models it is assumed that 
every break is permanent, which is not the case because of the dynamics of the business 
cycles. With regard to threshold regression analysis, Pieroni (2009, p. 332), in a recent paper, 
comments that ‘the threshold at which the nonlinearities between military spending and 
economic growth occur is largely variable and depends on the country-specific perception 
about uncertainty’. 
[Insert Fig. 2 about here] 
The results of the fixed as well as the time-varying transition probability two state 
Markov switching models (columns 5 and 6 of Table 4) allowing for a shift in the mean and 
the variance also indicate that the relationship between military spending changes and 
economic growth is state dependent. The estimated models are shown to be well defined: the 
standardized residuals exhibit no signs of linear or nonlinear dependence. The parameters of 
the mean and the variance are significant, and hence the periods of fast/slow economic growth 
and of high/low growth volatility seem to be accurately identified by the smoothed 
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probabilities. The null hypotheses of H0:
 21
   and H0:
 21
   are clearly rejected at any 
conventional significance level, hence the shifts in both the mean and the variance are 
justified.  
         Using both fixed and time-varying transition probability Markov switching models 
(columns 5 and 6), it appears that state one (two) is characterized by slow (fast) economic 
growth and high (low) growth volatility in the Chinese economy, corresponding to changes in 
trends and volatility over the sample period, as well as to the dynamics of business cycles 
rather than the long-term changes in the growth rates. Fig. 3 shows the plot for the economic 
growth, yt, smoothed probabilities, military spending changes, xt, and the time-varying 
transition probability of the low growth – high variance state (state 1). The probability of 
staying in state one (two) is 0.72 (0.87). The smoothed probabilities show a relatively low 
number of switches, consistent with the high persistence in the two states. There are 17 years 
(29.82%) where the process is in the first state and 40 years (70.18%) where the process is in 
the second state. 
[Insert Fig. 3 about here] 
More specifically, the results of the fixed transition probability Markov switching 
model (column 5) show that while the impact of military spending changes on economic 
growth in state one is negative, this impact turns out to be positive in state two, enforcing the 
nonlinear dependence between the two variables in China. The negative relationship 
20 
 
associated with lower growth - high variance state is consistent with the occurrence of 
crowding out effects, whereas the positive impact in the high growth - low variance state is 
consistent with the Keynesian income multiplier effect, the latter being a framework widely 
used in the analysis of developing countries. The crowding out effects suggest that an increase 
in military expenditure is to be financed either by increasing current taxes or borrowing, 
where the balance of payments deteriorates as a result of the latter. Nonetheless, the spending, 
in either case, not only reduces the expected after tax return on productive capital, but also the 
flow of savings that is available for productive capital, which in turn undermines economic 
growth (see Knight et al., 1996). The Keynesian income multiplier effect, on the other hand, 
posits that an increase in military spending may boost aggregate domestic demand capacity by 
inducing an increase in utilization (Dunne, 1996). Particularly, it increases the growth of 
current production relative to full capacity production.  
  With regard to the control variables, non-defence spending changes are shown to have 
a negative impact on growth using fixed transition probabilities. Government investment and 
human capital changes appear to exert insignificant effects on growth. Finally, the impact of 
population growth is positive and significant, implying that an increase in the labour force 
increases economic growth (Mintz and Stevenson, 1995). 
By considering the time-varying transition probability Markov switching model, the 
results (column 6) suggest that military spending changes also provide us with some inference 
21 
 
about the transition probabilities of switching the two growth states, low growth - high 
variance and high growth – low variance. The estimate of 1  is positive and significant, 
indicating that an increase in military spending increases the probability of remaining in the 
low growth – high variance state (see Fig. 3). This finding is also consistent with crowding 
out effects discussed earlier. With regard to the control variables, only population growth is 
shown to be significant. 
The above results are based on real GDP growth from China’s Statistical Yearbooks. 
Using the corresponding growth from Penn World Table (version 8), the results, as displayed 
in Table A1 in the Appendix, do not exhibit much variability across the estimated models. 
Overall, this indicates the robustness of the results discussed earlier.
17
 
 
VI. Conclusions 
  
          In this article, we have examined the dynamic relationship between economic growth 
and military spending changes in China over the period 1953 to 2010. Our argument is that 
the impact of military spending on economic growth is different between periods of faster and 
slower growth as well as between more and less volatile periods. Indeed, the results presented 
herein show that the dynamic linkage between military spending changes and economic 
growth is state dependent. Using a fixed transition probability Markov switching model, the 
                                                          
17
  We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion of using the real GDP growth from Penn World Tables to 
check the robustness of the results. 
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empirical findings suggest that military spending changes affect economic growth negatively 
in a slower growth - high variance state (consistent with crowding out effects), whilst the 
effect is positive in the fast growth - low variance one (consistent with the Keynesian income 
multiplier effect).  
Furthermore, the results of the time-varying transition probability Markov switching 
model show that military spending changes also provide inference with regard to the 
evolution of the transition probabilities across the high growth – low variance and low growth 
– high variance states. Specifically, it is shown that increases in military spending keeps 
economic growth in the lower growth – high variance state, consistent also with crowding out 
effects. In a broad sense, these results indicate important policy implications in which an 
increase in military spending hampers growth and affects the economy negatively during 
slower growth – higher volatility periods.  
 
Acknowledgments   
We are very grateful to Professor Ron Smith, John Hunter, Fabio Spagnolo and Nicola 
Spagnolo for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article. 
 
 
23 
 
References 
Aizenman, J. and Glick, R. (2006) Military expenditure, threats, and growth, Journal of 
International Trade & Economic Development, 15, 129-155. 
Arin, K. P. and Spagnolo, N. (2011) Short-term growth effects of fiscal policy revisited: a 
Markov-switching approach, Economics Letters, 110, 278-281. 
Azariadis, C. and Drazen, A. (1990) Threshold externalities in economic development, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, 465-90. 
Barro, R. J. (1990) Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth, Journal 
of Political Economy, 98, S103–S125. 
Barro, R. J. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1995) Economic Growth, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Benoit, E. (1973) Defence and Economic Growth in Developing Countries, Lexington Books, 
Boston. 
Benoit, E. (1978) Growth and defence in developing countries, Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, 26, 271-280. 
Bing-Fu, C. and Liming, Z. (2006) Determinants of China’s defence expenditure before and 
after transition. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 23, 227–244. 
Bo, C. and Xing, X. (2011) Military spending and economic growth in China, 1953–2007: a 
note on econometric analysis by using Eviews. In Frontiers of Peace Economics and 
24 
 
Peace Science (Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and 
Development), edited by M. Chatterji, C. Bo and R. Misra. Emerald, Bingley, 115–131. 
Chang, T., Fang, W., Wen, L.F. and Liu, C. (2001) Defence spending, economic growth and 
temporal causality: evidence from Taiwan and Mainland China. Applied Economics, 33, 
1289–1299.  
Chang, T., Lee, C.C, Hung, K. and Lee K.H. (2013) Does military spending really matter for 
economic growth in China and G7 countries: The roles of dependency and heterogeneity, 
Defence and Peace Economics, DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2013.763460.  
Chen, C. H. (1993) Causality between defence spending and economic growth: the case of 
Mainland China, Journal of Economic Studies, 20, 37–43. 
Chester, E. (1978) Military spending and capitalist stability, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 2, 293-298. 
Chowdhury, A. R. (1991) A causal analysis of defence spending and economic growth, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35, 80–97. 
Cuaresma, J. C. and Reitschuler, G. (2006) ‘Guns or butter?’ revisited: robustness and 
nonlinearity issues in the defence-growth nexus, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 
53, 523–542. 
Cusak, T. R. and Ward, M. D. (1981) Military spending in the United States, Soviet Union, 
and the People’s Republic of China, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25, 429-469. 
25 
 
Custers, P. (2010) Military Keynesianism today: an innovative discourse, Race Class, 51, 79-
94. 
Deger, S. and Sen, S. (1992) Military expenditure, aid and economic development, in 
Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1991, 
World Bank, Washington, DC, pp. 159–185 . 
Deger, S. and Sen, S. (1995) Military expenditure and developing countries, in K. Hartley, 
and T. Sandler (Eds), Handbook of Defence Economics: Vol. 1, Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 
275–307. 
Devarajan, S., Swaroop, V. and Zou, H-F. (1996) The composition of public expenditure and 
economic growth, Journal of Monetary Economics, 37, 313–344. 
Dimitraki, O. and Menla Ali, F. (2013) The long-run causal relationship between military 
spending and economic growth in China: revisited, Defence and Peace Economics. 
Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2013.810024. 
Dunne, J. P. (1996) Economic effects of military expenditure in developing countries: a 
survey, Contributions to Economic Analysis, 235, 439-464. 
Elliott, G., Rothenberg, T. and Stock, J. H. (1996) Efficient tests for an autoregressive unit 
root, Econometrica, 64, 813–836. 
Engle, R. F. and Granger, C. W. J. (1987). Co-integration and error correction: representation, 
estimation, and testing, Econometrica, 55, 251-276. 
26 
 
Feigenbaum, E. A. (1999) Soldiers, weapons and Chinese development strategy: the Mao era 
military in China’s economic and institutional debate, The China Quarterly, 158, 285- 
313. 
Filardo, A. J. (1994) Business-cycle phases and their transitional dynamics, Journal of 
Business & Economic Statistics, 12, 299-308. 
Garcia, R. (1998) Asymptotic null distribution of the likelihood ratio test in Markov switching 
models, International Economic Review, 39, 763-788. 
Gerace, M. P. (2002) US military expenditures and economic growth: some evidence from 
spectral methods,  Defence and Peace Economics, 13, 1-11. 
Giavanni, F, Jappelli, T. and Pagano, M. (2000) Searching for non-linear effects of fiscal 
policy: evidence from industrial and developing countries, European Economic Review, 
44, 1259-1289. 
Hall, R. E. (2009) By how much does GDP rise if the government buys more output?, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  183–249. 
Hamilton, J. D. (1989) A new approach to the economic analysis of non-stationary time series 
and the business cycle, Econometrica, 57, 357- 384. 
Hamilton, J. D. (1990) Analysis of time series subject to changes in regime. Journal of 
Econometrics, 45, 39-70. 
27 
 
Hansen, B. E. (1992) The likelihood ratio test under nonstandard conditions: testing the 
Markov switching model of GNP, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 7, 61-82. 
Hendry, D. F. and Ericsson, N. R. (1991) An econometric analysis of U.K. money demand in 
‘Monetary Trends in the United States and the United Kingdom’ by Milton Friedman and 
Anna Schwartz, American Economic Review, 81, 8–38. 
Heo, U. (1998) Modelling the defence-growth relationship around the globe, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 42, 637–657.  
Heo, U. (1999) Defence spending and economic growth in South Korea: the indirect link, 
Journal of Peace Research, 36, 699-708. 
Hooker, M. and Knetter M. (1997) Unemployment effects of military spending: evidence 
from a panel of states, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 29, 400–421. 
Jerzmanowski, M. (2006) Empirics of hills, plateaus, mountains and plains: a Markov 
switching approach to growth, Journal of Development Economics, 81, 357– 385. 
Johansen, S. (1995) Likelihood-Based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive 
Models, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Kalaitzidakis, P. and Tzouvelekas, V. (2011) Military spending and the growth-maximizing 
allocation of public capital: a cross-country empirical analysis, Economic Inquiry, 49, 
1029–1041.  
28 
 
Kinsella, D. (1990) Defence spending and economic performance in the United States: a 
causal analysis, Defence Economics, 1, 295–309. 
Knight, M., Loayza, N. and Villanueva, D. (1996) The peace dividend: military spending cuts 
and economic growth, IMF Staff Papers, 43, 1-37 
Kollias, C., Mylonidis, N. and Paleologou, S. M. (2007) A panel data analysis of the nexus 
between defence spending and growth in the European Union, Defence and Peace 
Economics, 18, 75–85. 
Kusi, N. K. (1994) Economic growth and defence spending in developing countries: a causal 
analysis, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38, 152-159. 
Lai, C. L., Huang, B. N. and Yang, C. W. (2005) Defence spending and economic growth 
across the Taiwan straits: a threshold regression model, Defence and Peace Economics, 
16, 45-57. 
Landau, D. (1993) The economic impact of military expenditure, The World Bank Working 
Paper Series 1138, The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Lee, J. and Strazicich, M. C. (2004) Minimum LM unit root test with one structural break. 
Appalachian State University Working Paper Series No 04-17, Department of 
Economics. 
Levine, R. and Renelt, D. (1992) A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth 
regressions, The American economic review, 82, 942-963. 
29 
 
Lindgren, G. (1984) Armaments and economic performance in industrialized market 
economies, Journal of Peace Research, 21, 375-387. 
Majeski, S. J. (1992) Defence budgeting, fiscal policy, and economic performance, in A. 
Mintz (Ed), The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States, Routledge, 
London, pp. 217–237 . 
Masih, A. M. M., Masih, R. and Hasan, M. S. (1997) New evidence from an alternative 
methodological approach to the defence spending-economic growth causality issue in the 
case of Mainland China, Journal of Economic Studies, 24, 123–140. 
Meng, B., Lucyshyn, W. and Li, X. (2013) Defence expenditure and income inequality: 
evidence from cointegration and causality for China, Defence and Peace Economics, 
DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2013.810026.  
Mintz, A. and Stevenson, R. T. (1995) Defence expenditures, economic growth, and the 
“peace dividend”: a longitudinal analysis of 103 countries, The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 39, 283-305. 
Naughton, B. (2007) The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Orlik, T. (2012) Understanding China's Economic Indicators: Translating the Data into 
Investment Opportunities, FT Press, New Jersey. 
Pieroni, L. (2009) Military expenditure and economic growth, Defence and Peace Economics, 
20, 327-339.  
30 
 
Pradhan, R.P. (2010) Defence spending and economic growth in China, India, Nepal and 
Pakistan: evidence from cointegrated panel analysis. International Journal of Economics 
and Finance, 12, 65–74. 
Ram, R. (1995) Defence expenditure and economic growth, in K. Hartley, and T. Sandler 
(Eds), Handbook of Defence Economics: Vol. 1,  Elsevier, Amsterdam and Oxford, pp. 
251-273. 
Richardson, P. (1999) Economic Change in China, C.1800–1950, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Roy, D. (1994) Hegemon on the horizon? China’s threat to East Asian security, International 
Security, 19, 149-168. 
Sala-i-Martin, X. X. (1997) I just ran two million regressions, The American Economic 
Review, 87, 178-183. 
Sandler, T. and Hartley, K. (1995) The Economics of Defence, CUP, Cambridge . 
Shieh, J., Lai, C. and Chang, W. (2002) The impact of military burden on long-run growth 
and welfare, Journal of Development Economics, 68, 443-454. 
Smith, R., Sola, M. and Spagnolo, F. (2002) The Prisoner’s Dilemma and regime-switching in 
the Greek-Turkish arms race, Journal of Peace Research, 37, 737-750. 
31 
 
Stroup, M. D. and Heckelman, J. C. (2001) Size of the military sector and economic growth: a 
panel data analysis of Africa and Latin America, Journal of Applied Economics, 49, 329–
360. 
Sun, Q. and Yu, Q. (1999) Determinants of China’s military expenditure: 1965–93, Journal of 
Peace Research, 36, 23–33. 
Tsay, R. S. (1986) Nonlinearity tests for time series, Biometrika, 73, 461-466. 
Wallace, M. D. (1980) Accounting for superpower arms spending, in P. McGowan, and C. W. 
Kegley (Eds), Threats, Weapons, and Foreign Policy, Sage, Beverly Hills, pp. 259–273. 
Waller, D. (1997) Estimating non-transparent military expenditures: the case of China (PRC),  
Defence and Peace Economics, 8, 225–241. 
Wang, S. (1999) The military expenditure of China, 1989–98, in SIPRI Yearbook 1999: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
pp. 334–350. 
Weede, E. (1983) Military participation rations, human capital formation, and economic 
growth: a cross-national analysis, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 11, 11-19. 
Wolde-Rufael, Y. (2001) Causality between defence spending and economic growth-The case 
of Mainland China: a comment, Journal of Economic Studies, 28, 227–230. 
Wood, J. (2010) Economic factors shaping China’s defence spending: historical trends and 
recent developments. Science Applications International Corp McLean VA.  
32 
 
Yakovlev, P. (2007) Arms trade military spending and economic growth, Defence and Peace 
Economics, 18, 317-338. 
Yang, A. J. F., Trumbull, W. N., Yang, C. W. and Huang, B. N. (2011) On the relationship 
between military expenditure, threat and economic growth: a non-linear approach, 
Defence and Peace Economics, 22, 449-457.  
Zivot, E. and Andrews, D. (1992) Further evidence of great crash, the oil price shock and unit 
root hypothesis, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 10, 251–270. 
 
Appendix: Robustness results 
[Insert Table A1 about here] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic growth 
Military spending changes 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-0.5
0.0
0.5
Fig. 2. The estimated constant (upper panel) and slope coefficient associated with 
military spending changes (lower panel) from moving window regression with 
standard errors (in blue) (window length is 3 years) 
Fig. 1. Economic growth and military spending changes in China over the period 
1953-2010 
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Table 1. Review of the empirical literature of China’s defence spending-economic growth nexus 
Author(s) Period     Methodology    Main finding(s) 
Chen (1993) 1950-1991 
1. Engle and Granger (1987) two-
step cointegration  
2. Granger causality tests 
1. EG and Milex are not 
cointegrated. 
2. No Granger causality between 
the two variables is found in the 
short-run. 
Masih et al. (1997) 1950-1991 
1. Johansen (1995) cointegration  
2. Granger causality tests 
1. EG and Milex are cointegrated. 
2. Causality runs from Milex to 
EG. 
Sun and Yu (1999) 1965-1993   OLS regression 
1. China’s GNP affects Milex. 
2. The results are robust 
irrespective of using official 
Chinese or ACDA data. 
Chang et al. (2001) 1952–1995 
1. Johansen (1995) cointegration 
2. Granger causality tests 
1. China’s national income and 
Milex are not cointegrated. 
2. Causality from EG to Milex 
changes is found in the short-
run.  
Wolde-Rufael (2001) 1950-1991 
1. A series of unit root tests  
2. Granger causality tests 
1. EG and Milex are not integrated  
of the same order. 
2. Causality runs from Milex 
changes to EG. 
Lai et al. (2005) 1953-2000 Multivariate threshold regression  
1. Arms race is found between 
Taiwan and China. 
2. China’s Milex changes leads EG 
in only one regime (when 
Taiwan’s spending growth is less 
than 5%). 
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Bing-Fu and Liming 
(2006) 
 
1960 -1999 
 
OLS regression 
1. Lagged Milex, GDP and changes 
in the strategic environment are 
major determinants of China’s 
Milex. 
2. Economic factors, the national 
security environment and lagged 
Milex are the primary 
determining factors of Milex 
prior to 1981.  
3. Lagged Milex affects Milex after 
1981. 
Pradhan (2010) 1988–2007 
1. Johansen (1995) cointegration 
2. Granger causality tests 
 
1. GDP, Milex and public debt are 
cointegrated. 
2. Causality from Milex changes to 
EG was detected in the short-
run. 
Bo and Xing (2011) 1953–2007 Granger causality tests 
1. No causality is found between 
Milex changes and EG.  
2. Causality from Milex changes 
to EG is only found for the 
period 1989 to 2007 using 
China’s official data, but not for 
SIPRI data. 
Chang et al. (2013)  1988-2010 
Bootstrap panel causality 
approach  
Causality from real GDP to Milex 
is found for China.  
Meng et al. (2013)  1989–2012 
1. Engle and Granger (1987) two-
step cointegration  
2. Granger causality tests 
1. Milex and income inequality are 
cointegrated. 
2. Causality from Milex changes 
to those of income inequality is 
found in the short-run. 
Dimitraki and Menla Ali 
(2013) 
1952-2010 
1. Bartlett corrected trace test for 
cointegration  
2. Long-run weak exogeneity 
tests 
1. Cointegration is found between 
Milex and real GDP along with 
some control variables. 
2. It is the economic development 
that drives increases in Milex. 
Notes: EG and Milex denote economic growth and military spending, respectively. 
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Table 2. Summary of descriptive statistics 
  Mean St. Dev Skewness Ex. Kurtosis JB 
Economic growth 0.083 0.071      −2.152 11.372 210.47*** 
Military spending changes     −0.031 0.186 0.260 10.200 123.79*** 
Notes: JB is the Jarque-Bera test for normality.  
*** denotes significance at 1%. 
 
 
Table 3. Unit root test results 
 Military spending changes   Economic growth
 
Panel A: DF-GLS tests       
Without trend   -2.432(4)
** 
-2.243(4)
** 
With trend -2.881(4) -4.844(4)
*** 
Panel B: One break LM tests 
 
Statistic 
  
BT  
   -10.510 (0)
**** 
[1973]
s 
=0.4 
-8.278 (2)
*** 
[1970]
s 
=0.5 
Notes: The 1% and 5% critical values for the DF-GLS test are respectively -2.608 and -
1.946 (without trend) and -3.754 and -3.177 (with the trend), the lag length, represented in 
parentheses (.), is selected on the basis of the Modified Akaike Information Criterion 
(MAIC) for the DF-GLS tests and the general-to-specific approach for the LM tests with a 
single break. The estimated breakpoints 
BT  for the single break LM tests are in square 
brackets [.], with s indicates that the indentified break point is significant at the 5% level. 
Critical values are displayed below for the minimum one break LM unit root test allowing 
for a shift in intercept and change in trend slope (Model C) for a sample of T=100, which 
depend (to some extent) on the location of the breakpoint ( =   /T where T is sample 
size) and are symmetric around  and (1- ). 
*** indicates significance at 1% and ** at 5%. 
Break point Critical values  
= (  /T) 1% 5%  
0.1 -5.11 -4.50  
0.2 -5.07 -4.47  
0.3 -5.15 -4.45  
0.4 –5.05 -4.50  
0.5 -5.11 -4.51  
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Table 4. Linear and Markov-switching models (GDP growth source: Chinese Statistical Yearbooks) 
 One-state  Two-state 
 OLS Extended OLS         FTP Extended FTP Extended TVTP 
        (1) (2) (3)          (4)          (5)          (6) 
1  
***
)0.013(
0.051   
)0.013(
***0.044        
)0.041(
0.035         
)0.015(
**0.032
 
   
)0.013(
*0.022     
)0.011(
**0.026  
2   
 
  
***
)0.010(
0.040
 ***
)0.017(
0.078  
***
)0.011(
0.065  
1  
 ***
)0.124(
0.365
     **
)0.239(
0.599        
**
)0.241(
0.574   
***
)0.105(
0.569
 ***
)0.106(
0.297  
**
)0.156(
0.307  
1   
 **
)0.047(
0.102     
)0.052(
0.080        
)0.065(
***0.223   
2      
        **
)0.026(
0.070   
1    
  
)0.096(
0.037        
)0.039(
*0.071     
)0.060(
0.016  
2    
  
)0.107(
0.122           
)0.040(
0.025     
)0.054(
.0060  
3  
        
*
)1.170(
2.300   
 ***
)0.529(
2.858  
***
)0.695(
2.896  
4  
    
)0.029(
0.025        
)0.012(
0.019      
)0.021(
0.029  
1  0.068 0.065       0.065  
***
)0.009(
0.082
        ***
)0.010(
0.057  
***
)0.013(
0.082  
2   
 
  
***
)0.001(
0.008
        ***
)0.002(
0.019  
***
)0.001(
0.018  
0   
 
  
 
         
**
)1.114(
2.686  
1   
 
  
 
         
**
)2.332(
5.300  
0   
 
            
***
)0.833(
2.482  
1   
             
)7.260(
3.376  
p11  
 
  
***
)0.024(
0.975  
***
)0.116(
0.726   
p21  
 
        
)0.021(
0.013          *
)0.063(
0.124   
        
LogLike 73.29 75.665 78.63        96.05 102.699 106.214 
Q (2) 2.413[0.120] 2.393[0.121] 1.620[0.203]  2.536 [0.111] 0.489 [0.484] 1.487 [0.222] 
ARCH (2) 0.500[0.774] 2.033[0.141] 0.599[0.552]  0.135 [0.874] 0.189 [0.827] 0.022 [0.977] 
Tsay Test 6.619[0.000]       
Notes: FTP and TVTP denote fixed and time-varying transition probability Markov switching models, respectively. Q(2) is a 
portmanteau test of serial correlation up to order 2. ARCH (2) is an ARCH test up to order 2. Standard errors are in parentheses (.), 
while p-values are reported in square brackets [.]. 
*** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
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Table A1. Linear and Markov-switching models (GDP growth source: PWT.8) 
 One-state  Two-state 
 OLS Extended OLS         FTP Extended FTP Extended TVTP 
 (1) (2) (3)          (4) (5) (6) 
1  
***
)0.011(
0.042  
***
)0.011(
0.038        
)0.031(
0.030         
*
)0.015(
0.029
    
)0.035(
*0.064     
)0.027(
**0.057  
2   
 
  
***
)0.011(
0.061
 ***
)0.014(
0.089  
***
)0.018(
0.073  
1  
 ***
)0.120(
0.459
     ***
)0.115(
0.482        
***
)0.175(
0.764   
***
)0.105(
0.569
 ***
)0.091(
0.388  
***
)0.134(
0.492  
1   
 **
)0.035(
0.081     
)0.039(
0.052        
)0.029(
***0.132   
2      
 **
)0.044(
0.094   
1    
   
)0.066(
0.053        
)0.030(
*0.061     **
)0.038(
0.084  
2    
   
)0.075(
0.121           
)0.035(
0.035         
)0.039(
0.024  
3  
         
)0.856(
1.079   
 ***
)0.412(
1.383  
***
)0.648(
1.784  
4  
     
)0.021(
0.018        
**
)0.010(
0.023       
)0.015(
0.024  
1  0.051 0.049       0.048  
***
)0.010(
0.068
 ***
)0.006(
0.028          
***
)0.011(
0.045  
2   
 
  
***
)0.002(
0.023
 ***
)0.002(
0.017  
***
)0.002(
0.017  
0   
 
  
 
         
**
)0.651(
1.569  
1   
 
  
 
         
**
)5.088(
10.839  
0   
     
        
)0.766(
0.214  
1   
             
)3.148(
2.823  
p11  
 
  
***
)0.039(
0.960  
***
)0.131(
0.473   
p21  
 
        
)0.018(
0.010          ***
)0.075(
0.227   
        
LogLike 89.42 92.12 95.67        103.31 111.88 114.216 
Q (2) 0.557[0.455] 0.382[0.536] 0.081[0.775]  1.142 [0.285] 0.256 [0.612] 0.449 [0.502] 
ARCH (2) 0.381[0.684] 2.689[0.077] 0.142[0.867]  0.036 [0.964] 0.180 [0.835] 0.216 [0.806] 
Notes: FTP and TVTP denote fixed and time-varying transition probability Markov switching models, respectively. Q(2) is a 
portmanteau test of serial correlation up to order 2. ARCH (2) is an ARCH test up to order 2. Standard errors are in parentheses (.), 
while p-values are reported in square brackets [.]. 
*** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
 
 
